Using survey evidence, I estimate the impact of a $12 billion package of household payments delivered in Australia between March and May 2009. Forty percent of households who said that they received the payment reported having spent it. This is approximately twice the spending rate that has been recorded in surveys assessing the 2001 and 2008 tax rebates in the United States. One possible explanation for this is that individuals are more likely to spend -bonuses‖ (as the Australian payments were described) than -rebates‖ (as the US payments were described). Using an approach for converting spending rates into an aggregate marginal propensity to consume (MPC), the Australian results are consistent with an aggregate MPC of 0.41−0.42. Since this estimate is based only on first-quarter spending, it may be an underestimate of the longer-run impact of the package on consumer expenditure.
Introduction
In The impact of this fiscal stimulus on aggregate spending in Australia and elsewhere has been hotly debated. While some claimed that putting additional cash in the pockets of householders would be an effective means of stimulating the economy, others argue that if handouts are funded by increased government debt, rational households will simply save the money. In the pithy words of George Mason University economist Russell Roberts, fiscal policy is akin to -taking a bucket of water from the deep end of a pool and dumping it into the shallow end.‖ Similar arguments have been made in the Australian policy debate. 1 To date, most analysis of the impact of the fiscal stimulus on expenditure has focused on analyzing the time series patterns of retail spending or household savings. Such an approach suffers from the limitation that it is difficult to know the counterfactual -what would have happened to expenditure and savings patterns in the absence of the policy change? With only 1 Speaking on the PM program on 4 February 2009, the Opposition's Treasury spokeswoman, Julie Bishop, argued -cash handouts, however attractive they might be to Australian people, do not achieve the desired outcome of a fiscal stimulus package‖. Similarly, speaking on the 7.30 Report on 3 February 2009, Opposition Leader, Malcolm Turnbull, argued that -John Taylor from Stanford has made this point eloquently before the US Congress in explaining how the one-off payments were ineffective as a stimulus and why increases in permanent income are more effective.‖ monthly or quarterly data, it is extremely difficult to separate the impact of the government's policy response from the shock caused by the global downturn.
In this paper, I therefore take a different approach to estimating the impact of the fiscal stimulus -using stated preference evidence from a survey that asked households whether they spent or saved the money that they received from the household stimulus package.
While economists are typically skeptical of survey responses, such evidence nonetheless provides a useful supplement to time series analysis. Indeed, even if one is inclined to believe that households systematically underreport or over-report their propensity to save a government payment, it is possible to use survey data to make comparisons across nations (assuming that the misreporting patterns remain the same).
To preview the results, I find that in the quarter in which the payments were delivered, 40 percent of respondents said that they spent the money they received from the household stimulus package. On reasonable assumptions about the distribution of marginal propensities to consume (MPC) across the population, this translates into an average MPC of 0.41−0.42.
The share of respondents who reported spending the Australian payment is higher than the share of US respondents who said that they spent the 2001 and 2008 tax rebates. One possible explanation for this is that the Australian payments were described as -bonuses‖, while the US payments were described as -rebates‖.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. In section 2, I outline the Australian fiscal stimulus package that is the subject of this analysis. In section 3, I discuss the survey instrument, present aggregate results, and compare them with earlier estimates from the United States. In section 4, I analyze the cross-sectional variation in the survey, as a way of checking that the variation in the survey is somewhat reasonable. The final section concludes with a discussion of the results and some caveats.
Australia's Fiscal Response to the Global Financial Crisis
According to calculations by the OECD, about two-fifths of Australia's fiscal package consisted of reduced taxes and transfers to households. This money was largely delivered in two tranches: on 14 October 2008, the government announced a package that it termed the ‗Economic Security Strategy'. The two largest household payments in this package were paid in December 2008, and focused on pensioners (single pensioners received $1400; pensioner couples $2100), Carer Allowance recipients ($1000) and families eligible for Family Tax Benefit A (FTB-A eligibility depends on family income and the number of children, and ceases at around $100,000 for a one-child family, or at about $125,000 for a three-child family). Together, these payments totaled around $8. survey was conducted on behalf of the Australian National University (ANU), and had a response rate of 32 percent. Although the primary focus of the survey was on attitudes towards taxation, it also included two questions about the fiscal stimulus. Respondents were asked whether they received a payment from the government -as part of the household stimulus package‖. Of the 1201 individuals surveyed, 817 (68 percent) said that they did receive a payment. This is less than the official estimate from the Australian government that -just under 80 percent‖ of families and singles would receive a payment under this package (Swan 2009 ). The three most likely explanations for the discrepancy are that some individuals were yet to receive their payment at the time of the survey; that some respondents did not regard family payments as theirs (perhaps because they were paid into a spouse's bank account); or that some respondents forgot about the payment or did not realise that they had received it.
3 However, while the mean receipt rate is likely understated, the differences across households are consistent with the policy design. For example, at least 80 percent of households with children who have incomes below $60,000 reported receiving a payment, but only around 50 percent of childless households with incomes over $150,000 reported having received a payment. (Since the survey did not ask about individual incomes, it is difficult to be sure about a given household's eligibility, but many households with a combined income over $150,000 would likely be eligible for the Tax Bonus for Working Australians).
Respondents who said they had received the payment were then asked -Thinking of the money you received from the household stimulus package, did you spend it, use it to pay bills, save it, or invest it?‖ 4 Table 1 Note: All percentages use population weights. In Panel B, ‗Saved' includes ‗Invested it', and ‗Paid off debt' includes all answers from ‗Used it to pay bills' to ‗Personal/short-term loans'. Shares in Panel B exclude respondents who answered ‗Don't know/Not sure' or who refused to answer the question.
In Table 2 Note: All percentages use population weights, except for the 2008 survey, which is unweighted. The 2001 US survey asked ‗Earlier this year a Federal law was passed cutting income tax rates and expanding certain credits and deductions. The tax cuts will be phased in over the next ten years. This year many households will receive a tax rebate check in the mail. In most cases, the tax rebate will be $300 for single individuals and $600 for married couples. Thinking about your (family's) financial situation this year, will the tax rebate lead you mostly to increase spending, mostly to increase saving, or mostly to pay off debt?'. The 2008 US survey asked ‗Under this year's economic stimulus program tax rebates will be mailed or directly deposited into a taxpayer's bank account. In most cases, the tax rebate will be $600 for individuals and $1200 for married couples. Those with dependent children will receive an additional $300 per child. Individuals earning more than $75,000 and married couples earning more than $150,000 will get smaller tax rebates or no rebate at all. Thinking about your (family's) financial situation this year, will the tax rebate lead you mostly to increase spending, mostly to increase saving, or mostly to pay off debt?'. Both US surveys were conducted by telephone. Implied MPC is calculated using the methodology set out in Shapiro and Slemrod (2003b) .
A key parameter in understanding the impact of a fiscal stimulus on the macroeconomy is the MPC. Shapiro and Slemrod (2003b) propose a formula for translating the share of respondents who report spending a payment into the aggregate MPC, using the assumption that respondents will tell a survey researcher that they mostly spend if their individual MPC exceeds 0.5. Specifically, converting individual responses into an aggregate MPC is based upon certain assumptions about the probability density function of the MPC across the population: most importantly, that the probability density function increases linearly until some maximum point and decreases linearly thereafter, and that each individual has the same weight in calculating the aggregate MPC.
Using the Shapiro-Slemrod approach, Figure 1 charts the relationship between the aggregate MPC and the share of survey respondents who respond that they spent a payment. The chart shows two bounds, using the two sets of parameters that produce the most extreme results at the tails of the distribution. In the bottom row of Table 2 , I use the Shapiro-Slemrod approach (and the same bounds as in Figure 1 ). This analysis implies an aggregate short-run MPC of around 0.35 for the two US packages, but 0.41−0.42 for the Australian package. However, it is important to remember that all these estimates are for the first quarter, and that the long-run MPC is likely to be higher. received a one-off payment from the Federal Government over the last 6-12 months how much of it have you spent?‖. The two key differences between that survey and the one analysed in this paper is that the Westpac survey referred to any payments received in the previous year (thereby including the December 2008 payments), and that it asked about the share of the payment that was spent, rather than for the primary purpose to which the money was put. However, the Westpac survey is consistent with the ANU estimate in that it estimated a very high expenditure rate. Of those respondents who said that they had received a payment, only 20.2 percent said they had spent none of it, 9.8 percent said they had spent less than half of it, 7.8 percent said they had spent more than half of it, and 62.2 percent said they had spent all of it. Assuming that spending is normally distributed around the range midpoints, and that payments were evenly spread across respondents, the researchers estimate Table 14 4. Is the Cross-Sectional Variation Reasonable?
Economists are understandably reluctant to prefer ‗stated preference' evidence to ‗revealed preference' data. One way to address this concern is to analyze the cross-sectional variation in the 2009 Australian survey, and see whether it accords with theory and similar empirical studies.
In Table 3 , I tabulate the spending rate across five variables: household income, respondent age, degree of worry about government debt (-How worried are you that increasing government debt will harm the financial future of future generations?‖), degree of worry about household unemployment (-How worried are you that in the next 12 months you or someone else in your household might be out of work and looking for a job for any reason?‖), and voting intention. For each variable, I also estimate an F-test on the hypothesis of equality across the categories, and report the p-value on this F-test. I also report a multivariate F-test, from a regression including all five variables. Univariate p-value is from an F-test on a linear probability regression of whether the respondent spent the rebate (0/1) on a set of indicator variables denoting each possible response category. The regression is estimated without a constant, and with all categories included. The null hypothesis in the F-test is that the spending rate is the same across all categories. The multivariate p-value conducts a similar exercise, but includes all variables in the table (again with an indicator for each category), and then conducts an F-test on each variable, again with the null hypothesis being that the spending rate is the same across all categories.
The results from the first variable indicate that there is no systematic relationship between household income and spending rates. While this may be surprising at first blush, it is consistent with the results of Shapiro and Slemrod, who argue that -low-income individuals are needy today, but because they are also likely to be needy in the future, they do not necessarily use the windfall for current consumption‖ (2009, 376) .
By respondent age, the spending rate trends upwards, though the relationship is not monotonic. Among respondents aged under 65, the average spending rate is 40 percent, compared to 45 percent for respondents aged 65 or over. However, while the age differences are consistent with a life-cycle model, they are not statistically significant.
The third variable tabulates the spending rate against respondents' degree of worry about government debt. This is a loose test of Ricardian equivalence -the theory that consumers will only spend a payment if it is accompanied by a reduction in government expenditure.
Respondents who are more worried about government debt (and therefore perhaps more concerned that government payments now will lead to tax increases in the future) are significantly less likely to spend the rebate. For example, only 25 percent of respondents who are -very worried‖ about government debt spent the rebate, as compared with 46 percent of respondents who are -not at all worried‖ about government debt. This difference remains significant even in a multivariate regression.
The fourth question looks at the relationship between spending rates and households' worry that they or a member of their family will become unemployed. Thirty percent of respondents who are -very worried‖ about unemployment spent the rebate, as compared with 44 percent of respondents who are -not at all worried‖ about household unemployment. Although this is consistent with the liquidity hypothesis (in which households are more likely to spend if they are optimistic about the future), the difference between categories is only statistically significant in the univariate specification, and not in the multivariate specification.
The final variable against which I tabulate spending rates is voting intention. Somewhat surprisingly, those who said that they would vote for Labor (the incumbent party) were much more likely to spend the rebate than those who said that they would vote for the opposition Liberal or National parties. This result is not merely an artefact of the income, age, or debt attitudes of the respondents, since it remains statistically significant (at the 1 percent level) in a multivariate regression. One possible interpretation is that individuals' willingness to respond to government exhortations to spend the payment is partly a function of their political views. Another possibility is reverse causality: respondents with a predisposition towards spending the payment might have been more inclined to think that the payment was good policy, and therefore more inclined to support the government.
Overall, the cross-sectional variation provides weak support for the life-cycle hypothesis and the liquidity hypothesis, and strong support for the notion that beliefs in Ricardian equivalence explains differences in spending patterns across individuals. Intriguingly, the cross-sectional variation also suggests some role for partisan beliefs in explaining spending differences.
Conclusion
Using survey responses, I estimate the impact of $12 billion in household payments delivered 7 One possibility is that the cross-country difference is due to the fact that the stimulus was framed as a ‗rebate' in the US and a ‗bonus' in Australia. Epley, Mak and Idson (2006) presented experimental evidence demonstrating that subjects were considerably more likely to spend windfall income if it was described as a ‗bonus' than if it is described as a ‗rebate'. Across their three experiments, the spending rate was at least twice as high for ‗bonus' payments as for ‗rebate' payments. They hypothesize that the difference is due to the fact that individuals regard rebates as returning them to a previous wealth state, but regard bonuses as an unexpected improvement upon the status quo.
8
For the Australian payments, the Shapiro/Slemrod approach for converting spending rates into MPCs suggests a first-quarter MPC of 0.41−0.42. However, there are two important limitations of this estimate. The first is that it is based only on a single survey question.
Ideally, one would wish to have both an MPC estimate from expenditure surveys (or scanner 7 Another possibility is that at the relevant times, Australian households had more bullish expectations for the economy than their US counterparts. While comparable measures of expectations are difficult to obtain, one possible approach is to look at the actual change in unemployment. From 2000 to 2002, the US unemployment rate rose from 4 percent to 6 percent. From mid-2007 to mid-2009, the unemployment rate in the US jumped from 5 percent to 10 percent, while the rise in Australia was only from 4 percent to 6 percent. These data suggest that one might have expected Australians in 2008 to be more optimistic than US residents in 2008, but do not explain why US residents in 2001 should have been more pessimistic than Australians in 2008. Yet another possible explanation is that household debt ratios explain differences in the MPC. However, the ratio of household debt to household disposable income in Australia and the United States was quite similar during this period. 8 For an overview of research on behavioral economics and tax policy -including framing effects -see Congdon, Kling and Mullainathan (2009) . The other limitation of the approach used in this paper is that it only estimates the short-term impact of the 2009 payments on household spending. Although it is likely that the total effect of the payments on consumer expenditure exceeds the first-quarter impact, the survey approach is not well suited to estimating the long-run effect, since it relies on households accurately recollecting what they did with a payment that was received up to 6 months before the survey. Unless the payment constitutes a large share of household income, longer-run estimates are likely to be more noisily measured than short-run estimates.
